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Abstract:  All subtypes of influenza Type A viruses infect wild birds, especially waterfowl and 
shorebirds, but rarely cause disease or mortality in these aquatic species.  Aquatic birds are the 
natural reservoirs for low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI) that are distributed globally.  
However, some AI subtypes can be virulent in other animals and humans and some highly 
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pathogenic AI viruses (HPAI) have caused major outbreaks in poultry and even pandemics in the 
human population.  The emergence of a HPAI H5N1 subtype in southeast Asian poultry in 1997 
subsequently involved migratory waterfowl in 2005 and has since spread westward throughout 
the Asian, European, and African continents.  This rapid continental spread alarmed animal and 
human health agencies in North America and initiated the establishment of a National Strategy 
for Pandemic Influenza in the United States to increase and expand surveillance for the early 
detection of this virus, to improve and expand preventative measures, and to develop 
contingency responses to possible outbreaks.  One of the methods of emergency surveillance 
developed and implemented was an interagency, early detection system for HPAI H5N1 avian 
influenza in wild migratory birds with the potential to bring in the virus from Asia or Europe and 
spread it throughout North America.  
 As part of this early detection system, the Wildlife Services National Wildlife Research 
Center developed testing methods, sampling protocols, guidelines, and analyzed 50,184 avian 
fecal samples collected by Wildlife Service biologists in 50 states and the U. S. territories.  
Samples were pooled in the laboratory (n = 10,541 pools) and analyzed using RT-PCR.  AI 
viruses were detected in 4.0% of the 10,541 sample pools analyzed and H5/H7 subtypes were 
detected in 0.2% of the sample pools.  Positive H5 and H7 subtypes were shipped to the National 
Veterinary Services Laboratory for further evaluation and confirmation.  This monitoring effort 
was successful in detecting AI viruses in environmental samples and has proven to be a rapid and 
cost effective surveillance method. 
 
Proceedings of the 12th Wildlife Damage 
Management Conference (D.L. Nolte, W.M. 
Arjo, D.H. Stalman, Eds). 2007 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Avian influenza viruses 
(Influenzavirus, Orthomyxoviridae) infect 
wild birds globally and the natural reservoirs 
are wild waterfowl, gulls and shorebirds 
(Webster 1998). Ducks, particularly 
dabbling ducks, are the primary species 
infected with low pathogenic avian 
influenza viruses that rarely cause disease or 
mortality in wild aquatic species. LPAI 
viruses have been isolated from more than 
100 wild bird species using cloacal samples 
with an overall prevalence of 5.16% (Table 
1) and nearly all of the AI virus subtypes 
have been detected in wild bird reservoirs or 
poultry (Olsen et al. 2006).  Avian Influenza 
viruses are shed in the feces of infected 
waterfowl and AI virus can persist in feces 
for short periods and remain relatively stable 
and viable for days to months in water in 
which the birds swim, defecate, and feed 
(Stallknecht et al. 1990; Ito et al. 1995). 
Fecal/oral transmission is the primary 
method of virus spread to susceptible 
waterbirds and may be more efficient in 
shallow water where the virus is more 
concentrated and thus more likely to expose 
dabbling ducks that feed there.  
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Table 1. Groups of waterbirds infected with avian influenza viruses  (adapted from Olsen et al. 
2006). 
Bird Group No. Species No. Tested No. Positive % Positive 
Ducks 36 34,503 3,275 9.5% 
Geese 8 4,806 47 1.0% 
Swans 3 5,009 94 1.9% 
Gulls 9 14,505 199 1.4% 
Terns 9 2,521 24 0.9% 
Waders 10 2,637 21 0.8% 
Rails 3 1,962 27 1.4% 
Petrels 5 1,416 4 0.3% 
Cormorants 1 4,500 18 0.4% 
Total 84 71,859 3,709 5.16% 
 
 
AI virus strains can infect and have 
low virulence for domestic and wild birds.  
However, these viruses are unstable and 
evolution of AI viruses occur with 
unpredictable frequency through the 
constant mingling of multiple subtypes in 
wild waterfowl populations and the frequent 
exchange of genetic material (Webster et al. 
1992).  Therefore, some AI virus subtypes 
can become highly virulent and produce 
acute clinical disease and mortality in 
poultry.  These highly pathogenic AI 
(HPAI) viruses are extremely infectious, and 
once established, can spread rapidly among 
poultry flocks and wild bird populations. 
 An outbreak of a new high 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 
subtype virus occurred in Hong Kong 
poultry in 1997 and reemerged in 2002-03 
(Webster et al. 2006).  This H5N1 virus 
devastated the poultry industry in Southeast 
Asia since 2004 and caused an outbreak and 
mortality in migratory geese in Qinghai 
Lake, China during 2005 (Liu et al. 2005).  
HPAI H5N1 virus then spread from China 
south to Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, 
Laos, and Indonesia where numerous 
outbreaks occurred in poultry and numerous 
human cases were reported that were 
acquired from sick or dead poultry (WHO 
2006).   It has subsequently spread across 
Asia, Europe, Middle East, and into Africa 
in 2005-06 while causing mortality in 
poultry, swans, waterfowl species, and 
occasional other species.  The outbreaks in 
poultry resulted in over 209 million birds 
dying or being culled around much of the 
world since January 2004 (Peiris et al. 
2007). 
 The local and continental 
geographical spread of the HPAI H5N1 
virus was a result of a combination of 
factors.  Local spread was likely achieved by 
human movement of poultry and poultry 
products (Webster et al. 2006). Longer-
distance spread within and across regions 
likely occurred as a result of commercial 
trade of poultry and poultry products and 
migratory birds. The role of migratory 
waterfowl and shorebirds has been 
implicated in the global spread of AI 
viruses, especially LPAI (Olsen et al. 2006).  
Millions of wild birds move within and 
between large continents along major routes 
or flyways where bird populations connect 
with each other and transmit viruses during 
the sharing of common wintering areas, 
staging areas, or breeding grounds.  For 
example, birds migrating within the West 
Pacific and the East Asian-Australasian 
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flyways overlap with each other and with 
birds in Alaska where some of them share 
common breeding areas with North 
American birds (Webster et al. 2006).  
 Serious concerns have been raised 
about the potential impact of HPAI H5N1 
virus on domestic poultry, wild bird 
populations, and humans in the event that it 
is introduced into the United States. One 
potential route of introduction of H5N1 into 
the United States could be through the 
migration of infected wild birds through 
Alaska and the Pacific flyway or through 
eastern Canada and the Atlantic flyway 
(Peterson 2006).  In response to these 
concerns, the U.S. government developed a 
“National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza” 
(http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab1.html). 
One major component of this national 
strategy was an interagency strategic plan 
for an early detection system for highly 
pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in wild 
migratory birds (USDA 2006). The plan 
outlined five major surveillance strategies 
for detecting H5N1: 1) investigation of 
morbidity/mortality events; 2) surveillance 
of live wild birds; 3) surveillance of hunter-
killed birds; 4) sentinel species; and 5) 
environmental sampling.  The National 
Wildlife Research Center (NWRC), Wildlife 
Services, Animal Plant Heath Inspection 
Service, United States Department of 
Agriculture, was designated to develop 
methods for the detection of AI viruses in 
environmental samples by direct PCR, 
organize field collection of samples, and test 
environmental samples collected nationwide 
from high-risk waterfowl habitats in the 
United States.  The environmental sampling 
involved the analysis of both water and fecal 
material collected from waterfowl habitat to 
provide evidence of AI circulating in wild 
bird populations, the specific AI subtypes, 
levels of pathogenicity, and possible risks to 
humans and poultry.  The Wildlife Disease 
Program of NWRC conducted the laboratory 
testing of fecal samples collected in all 50 
states and United States territories by WS 
and associated field biologists. The methods 
developed and results of this sampling in 
2006 are presented here. 
 
METHODS 
 National surveillance utilizing 
environmental sampling was initially 
focused on Alaska, where H5N1 was likely 
to be introduced from Asia, and secondarily 
on the Atlantic coast, where HPAI could be 
introduced by migratory birds that cross 
over the Atlantic Ocean from Europe to 
Canada and south along the eastern coast of 
the United States (USDA 2006). Special 
attention was given to locations along major 
flyways, particularly the Pacific and 
Mississippi flyways, that migratory 
waterfowl use when moving south from 
Alaska and Canada during the fall and 
winter.  These birds over winter in the 
southern United States and farther south into 
the Caribbean and Latin America.  The goal 
was to select sites containing feeding 
waterfowl of priority species of dabbling 
ducks identified in the wild bird plan 
(USDA 2006) and to collect 20-30 fresh 
fecal samples from each location.  The 
spacing of the collection was designed to 
represent, as much as possible, the 
distribution of all birds using the local body 
of water, and to collect 5 separate samples at 
multiple sites along the shore.  A sample 
was collected from each fresh feces in the 
field with a swab that was immediately 
placed in a vial with transport media (BA-1) 
containing antibiotics.  Samples were 
labeled with bar codes, transported from the 
field on ice packs, and shipped with ice 
packs to the NWRC in Colorado within 48 
hours of collection.  
 Once sample shipments were 
received at the NWRC laboratory, bar codes 
on all samples and corresponding data sheets 
were scanned and entered into a laboratory 
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information management database system 
(limsExpressTM, Dynamic Databases, 
Guthrie, OK), that was specifically designed 
to handle the large volume of samples that 
were received and tested for AI viruses.  
Samples were pooled with 1–5 samples per 
pool based on GPS coordinates and dates of 
sampling.  Pooled samples were treated with 
inhibitex (Qiagen Inc., Valencia, CA) to 
reduce natural inhibitors and RNA was 
extracted by hand if there were < 100 pooled 
samples, or with a robotic workstation 
(BioRobot MDx, Qiagen Inc., Valencia, 
CA), if there were >100 pooled samples to 
process at once.  Extracted RNA was tested 
by PCR (7900 HT, Real-Time PCR System, 
Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA) with a 
primer for the AI matrix gene. Any AI 
matrix positive pool was subsequently tested 
with H5 and H7 specific primers/probes 
following the procedures described in 
Spackman et al. (2002).  The real-time PCR 
assay using the AI virus matrix gene was 
developed for the rapid detection of type A 
influenza virus and the H5 and H7 
hemagglutinin subtype-specific probe sets 
were developed to detect potential HPAI 
viruses (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, 
CA).  H5 and H7 positive pools were 
shipped overnight within 48 hours of our 
receiving the samples to the National 
Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL) in 
Ames, Iowa, where confirmation, virus 
isolation, subtyping, genetic analysis, and 
pathogenicity testing of H5N1 positives 
were conducted.  The standard procedures 
for detection of influenza virus at NVSL 
were virus isolation in embryonated chicken 
eggs and hemagglutinin subtyping by 
hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay 
(Swayne et al. 1998).  The results were 
reported through established administrative 
channels.  
 An expert external committee was 
formed to develop a nationwide, statistically 
rigorous sampling design to provide 
scientific guidance to WS operations 
biologists in collecting samples from all 50 
states for the detection of HPAI H5N1 virus.  
The committee will also provide guidance in 
implementing the design using an adaptive 
management approach and analysis of data 
resulting from implementation of the design. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 From May 1 to December 31, 2006, 
50,184 fecal samples were collected from all 
50 states, Guam, American Samoa, and the 
Marshall Islands with a mean of 1,004 
samples (range = 114-1,505) collected per 
state or territory. These samples were tested 
in 10,541 pools.  Of these pools, 419 pools 
(4.0%) were found PCR positive for AI 
viruses and 22 pools (0.2%) were PCR 
positive for H5/H7 subtypes (20 H5 and 2 
H7), that were sent to NVSL for 
confirmation and identification.  None of the 
AI positive sample pools were confirmed as 
H5N1.  No AI viruses were detected in any 
sample pools from Hawaii, Maryland, 
Wyoming, or the Pacific Island territories. 
AI viruses were isolated in embryonated 
chicken eggs at NVSL from 14 of the 22 
PCR positives (64%) and the AI subtypes 
isolated thus far included 8 H5 subtypes (6 
H5N2 and 2 H5N8), 2 H3N2, and 1 each of 
H3N4, H4N6, H10N7, and H11N9 subtypes.  
No AI viruses were isolated from 5 of the 
PCR positives, but 3 low pathogenic avian 
paramyxovirus-1 viruses were isolated.  
 This sampling effort determined that 
fecal samples contain AI virus that can be 
detected directly by RT-PCR without BSL-3 
containment.  No H5N1 viruses were 
confirmed although other AI virus subtypes 
were identified. Environmental sampling 
was successful in detecting an overall 
prevalence of 4% AI viruses from a wide 
variety and quality of waterfowl habitats 
over an 8 month sampling period.  This 
prevalence is similar to the overall AI 
prevalence of infection in individual wild 
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birds (5%) reported previously (Olsen et al. 
2006).   Environmental sampling of 
waterfowl fecal samples appears to be a 
viable method of monitoring AI viruses in 
waterfowl populations. Environmental 
sampling requires less effort than sampling 
live birds and has proven to be a rapid, cost 
effective surveillance method.  Fecal 
sampling could complement regular bird 
sampling or substitute for capturing and 
sampling birds at sites where it may be the 
only reasonable approach.  
 Future activities will include the 
comparison of fecal sampling to 
cloacal/tracheal sampling of live birds for 
detecting AI infections in water birds. Water 
sampling for the detection of AI viruses by 
PCR was investigated in 2006 and will be 
fully developed and implemented as an 
additional surveillance method. The 
sampling design committee has reviewed 
band recovery data and the distribution of 
fecal samples collected from wild birds in 
2006 to develop a targeted sampling strategy 
for fecal sampling for the 2007 national 
HPAI surveillance in wild migratory birds.  
This more targeted approach will focus 
sampling in areas with the highest risk of 
HPAI introduction. 
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